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The U.S. Government should resurrect within the foreign affairs agencies a construct similar to the old U.S. Information Agency (USIA). This new agency, called the Public Diplomacy
Agency (PDA), should be tightly coupled to the State Department in both policy and management, as the model provided by the current relationship between the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The Public Diplomacy Agency, in a tripartite relationship with the State Department and USAID, could be a more effective instrument for achieving U.S. objectives for wielding the information instrument of national power. With Presidential appointment of the Director and Congressional appropriation of funding, this independent agency will have the agility to execute its mission and yet be accountable to national security policy and the public. This paper reviews public diplomacy as a form of "soft power", showing how it can be used to promote the U. S. national interests in the Arab and Muslim world. It assesses the State Department's progress in its public diplomacy effortssince the advisory group published its report over one year ago. Recent public diplomacy efforts are illustrated through three examples of recent efforts. Likewise, several assessments of public diplomacy are provided from academics, former government officials, and non-governmental organizations. Reconsidering the Djerejian Report. 41 He claims that the Report was too easy on the State Department. Brown believes that many of the public diplomacy challenges discussed in the report are not new; they have existed since World War I1. He recognizes that accurate measurement of the effectiveness of public diplomacy is difficult, if not impossible, but claims the Report does not make any specific recommendations to address the problem. Brown critically observes that the Report recommendations are unimaginative, simply calling for continuation of existing programs, more bureaucracy, and more funding. Nevertheless, Brown proposes that program assessment is not as important as acknowledgement that public diplomacy programs are inexpensive and life would be more dangerous without them. He recommends that foreign officers should be empowered to implement public diplomacy solutions that they feel will work for their regions. Brown also suggests that Americans should be reminded that cultural differences play a significant part in foreign policy, so public diplomacy should be considered in development of foreign policy. 42 Again, a suggestion that public diplomacy is not given sufficient emphasis at the strategic level within the State Department for public diplomacy, she stated, "the foundation of our public diplomacy strategy is to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics in order to increase understanding for American values, policies, and initiatives." She asserted that the ways to achieve these ends are "through traditional programs and all the tools of technology, involving both public and private sectors" along with "daily briefings and public outreach by our missions around the world." The U.S. has taken great efforts to expand U.S. influence in the Arab and Muslim world through public diplomacy efforts. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy provides some of these details in its 2004 Report. " The report concludes that "significant progress has been made in many areas, but there is still much that can be accomplished" and "[t]he agencies and structures of public diplomacy need to be properly coordinated to achieve maximum efficiency." " The commission states that U.S. public diplomacy is making an impact and suggests that it can benefit from a strategic level influence. According to Edgar Schein, a prominent organizational theorist, coordination of effort is one of the four essential elements that must be present for an organization to perform effectively. 56 The establishing of an internal policy-coordinating committee for public diplomacy attempts to achieve this coordination of effort within the State Department. Schein defines another of his essential elements, authority structure, as having a suitable organizational structure or chain of command that gives one the rights to direct the actions of others. 57 The State Department has public diplomacy functions split between organizations having different chains of command. Without a proper authority structure, it will be difficult to achieve coordinated public diplomacy efforts effectively.
The State Department should apply the organizational model used during the USAIDState Department merger to establish a independent Public Diplomacy Agency. Similar to USAID, this new agency would have a director appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate as well as its own funding appropriated by Congress. The Director of the Public Diplomacy Agency, receiving strategic policy guidance from the Secretary of State, will have the agility of independent funding and the coordination of effort and authority structure to realize strategic direction over U.S. public diplomacy initiatives.
CONCLUSIONS
Since the Advisory Group published its report on the use of public diplomacy to influence the hearts and minds of the Arab and Muslim people, the U.S. State Department has made improvements. Surveys have demonstrated that the most efficient public diplomacy instrument to get that American message to the Arab and Muslim publics is broadcast communications.
The State Department and the Broadcast Board of Governors have made great progress in this area. Probably the most difficult challenge for the State Department will be to develop feedback mechanisms to measure effectiveness of the myriad of public diplomacy programs. In the face of this challenge, we should maintain an awareness that without any of the public diplomacy efforts the world would be a more dangerous place.
Although the State Department has made improvements in wielding the information element of national power, public diplomacy initiatives continue lack adequate funding, coordination with other foreign affairs agencies and strategic direction. Despite these imperfections, the State Department has demonstrated the necessary knowledge and processes for execution of public diplomacy through the recent expansion of U.S. influence in the Arab and Muslim world.
The State Department has the tools for public diplomacy but lacks an efficient organizational structure to provide strategic focus. An organizational change within the state department can ensure that public diplomacy policy is effectively coordinated at the department level and will allow for greater influence at the cabinet or strategic level. The U.S. Government should resurrect within the Foreign Affairs Agencies a construct similar to the old U.S.
Information Agency. This new agency, called the Public Diplomacy Agency, should be tightly coupled to the State Department in both policy and management similar to the USAI D organizational model. The Public Diplomacy Agency, in a tripartite relationship with the State Department and USAID, will be a more effective instrument for achieving U.S. objectives for wielding the information instrument of national power. With the Director appointed by the President and independent funding appropriation, this agency will have the authority and flexibility to more effectively execute public diplomacy and yet remain accountable to the public.
The State Department -USAID model worked exceptionally well for the recent tsunami relief efforts in Asia, it could certainly create a more effective organization for employing the information element of national power and ensuring the Arab and Muslim World hear a consistent U.S. message.
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